Michigan Law Review
Volume 99

Issue 6

2001

Science Gone Astray: Evolution and Rape
Elisabeth A. Lloyd
Indiana University, Bloomington

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Science Gone Astray: Evolution and Rape, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1536 (2001).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol99/iss6/17

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

SCIENCE GONE ASTRAY:
EVOLUTION AND RAPE
Elisabeth A. Lloyd*
A

NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL
COERCION. By Randy Thornhill and Craig T. Palmer. Cambridge:

MIT Press. 2000. Pp. xvi, 251. $28.95.

It is clear where the opposition is coming from - it's coming from ideol
ogy. . . . Most of the ideology is coming from certain feminist groups. It's
not feminism, per se, that's against us. It is certain groups of feminists
that are against the application of science for dealing with this problem.
That is a socially very irresponsible position.1

Throughout A Natural History of Rape, coauthors Randy
Thomhill2 and Craig Palmer3 resort to what is known among philoso
phers of science as "The Galileo Defense," which amounts to the fol
lowing claim: I am telling the Truth and doing excellent science, but
because of ideology and ignorance, I am being persecuted.4 The
authors have repeated and elaborated upon this defense during the
si:lable media flurry accompanying the book's publication in February
2000.5
* Arnold and Maxine Tanis Chair of History and Philosophy of Science and Professor
of Biology, Indiana University, Bloomington. B.A. summa cum laude, 1980, University of
Colorado, Boulder; Ph.D. (Philosophy) 1984, Princeton. - Ed. I would like to thank Rich
ard Dawkins, Steve Downes, Alex Klein, Michael Wade, and Rasmus Winther for their use
ful comments on earlier drafts of this Review.

1. Interview by Mike Dano with Randy Thornhill (Feb. 4, 2000), in Daily Lobo (U. New
Mexico).
2. Regents' Professor and Professor of Biology, University of New Mexico.

3.

Instructor of Anthropology, University of Colorado.

4. Thornhill and Palmer write:
Why have researchers attempting to discover the evolutionary causes of rape been denied
positions at universities? Why have organizers of scholarly conferences attempted to keep
papers on evolutionary analysis of rape from being presented? Why have editors of scholarly

journals refused to publish papers treating rape in a Darwinian perspective?

P. 105. And later: "The choice between the social science explanation's answers and the
evolutionarily informed answers provided in this book is essentially a choice between ideol
ogy and knowledge." P. 189.
5. "In the future; I anticipate, hopefully not the too distant future, that we'll turn this
thing around in a sense t�at people will look back with horror at the kinds of attitudes that
Brownmiller is expressing today and, to a degree, Dr. Coyne. And the horror will be in the
fact that people did not understand that, in the Dark Ages, the validity and importance of
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Now, history has accepted this defense from Galileo. But in order
for it to work for Thornhill and Palmer, of course, they must be telling
the Truth and doing excellent science. In this Review I shall argue that
the Galileo defense is impotent in the hands of Thornhill and Palmer
because of glaring flaws in their science.
I.

THEIR CLAIMS

Thornhill and Palmer present two alternative evolutionary expla
nations for the existence of human rape. They claim that rape behav
ior must either have evolved through a process of natural selection that it must be a specific adaptation - or it must be the byproduct of
some underlying traits which must themselves be adaptations.
Their main arguments for these theses all rest on a hypothesis
about the evolution of sex differences: that because women bear the
brunt of the effort in reproduction - through pregnancy, nursing, and
infant care - they have evolved to be very selective about their mates.
Men, on the other hand, by virtue of the possibility of being able to
reproduce with the minimal investment of mere ejaculation, have
evolved to seek out as many mates as possible, and to copulate with no
intention of co-parenting or providing. This has led to such traits of
male sexuality as the desire for casual sex, the seeking out of a wide
variety of mates, and a stronger disregard for the particular features of
a given mate. Hence, female and male "reproductive strategies" differ:
women choose mates carefully, whereas men seek multiple mates.6.
Here is how each of Thornhill and Palmer's two theses about rape
relies on this picture of evolved male sexuality. They call their first hy
pothesis - that men have evolved, through natural selection, a spe
cific tendency toward rape behavior - the "rape-specific" hypothesis.
On this view, men who had trouble attaining sexual access to females
- especially because of low status or evidence of inferior genetic
make-up - must have resorted to rape in order to satisfy their sexual
urges to mate with a larger number of women. Thi�. trait, a disposition
to rape behavior, helped get these males' genes into the human gene
pool by increasing mate number, and thereby increasing the frequency
of "rape genes" in the population, through the process of natural se
lection. In other words, the reproductive problems facing our human
ancestors were very specific, and thus the mechanism that "solved"
science for correcting our social problems. But specifically in response to the kind of data
that we have in there, it's all scientific approach...." Talk of the Nation (Nat'! Public Radio,
Jan. 26, 2000) (comments of Randy Thornhill); see also Erica Goode, What Provokes a Rap
ist to Rape?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2000, at B9; Scott Sandliri, Rape; a Biological Act, UNM
Professor Writes , ALBUQUERQUE J., Jan. 22, 2000, at Al; Lawrence Spohn, Balance of
Power, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Jan. 14, 2000, at A2.
6. This is a standard view among many biologists working on human and animal evolu
tion.
'
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these problems - i.e., the tendency to rape itself - is also specific.
Therefore, the rape-specific adaptation hypothesis is favored.
Evolution by natural selection occurs when individuals of one type
of genetic makeup (genotype) reproduce more successfully than indi
viduals of other types of genetic makeup, resulting in a change within
the whole population of the proportions of each type. In order for
natural selection to work in favor of a particular genotype, the geno
type must be associated with a trait that is inheritable and that in
creases the organism's reproductive success. In this case, the rapists
would succeed reproductively while men who were otherwise geneti
cally equivalent but who were not rapists would have failed at repro
ducing. The long-term effect of this pattern of reproductive success on
human demographics would thus have been the increasing frequency
of the rapist type within the human population.
When a trait evolves (or is "chosen") through natural selection, it
is called an evolutionary adaptation. Thus, the primary hypothesis de
fended in Thornhill and Palmer's book is that rape is an evolutionary
adaptation - that it evolved because rape behavior itself was repro
ductively superior to nonraping behavior.
Under Thornhill and Palmer's second hypothesis, which they call
the "byproduct" view, evolved psychological traits such as the male
desire for a wide variety of mates led accidentally to the existence of
rape, but rape itself was not directly selected. That is, the act of rape is
an incidental byproduct of other male sexual adaptations, "especially
those that function to produce the sexual desires of males for multiple
partners without commitment" (p. 60). The phenomenon of evolu
tionary "byproducts" is frequent in human evolution. Manual dexter
ity, for example, was directly selected because it was reproductively
advantageous to our ancestors for making tools, etc., and is therefore
an adaptation. Our use of manual dexterity in playing the piano is a
byproduct of the selection on manual dexterity. It is not an evolution
ary adaptation itself. Note that selection leading to evolutionary adap
tation is involved in this scenario, but the trait of playing the piano is
distinct from the evolutionary adaptation itself; it is an epiphenome
non.
Thornhill and Palmer consider each of these hypotheses about the
evolution of human rape - the hypothesis that rape is a specifically
selected adaptation, and the hypothesis that rape is an evolutionary
byproduct of selection on other traits. Most of their attention, how
ever, centers on the rape-specific hypothesis.
To buttress this hypothesis, Thornhill and Palmer propose a num
ber of subsidiary psychological adaptations that would have increased
men's chance of reproductive success when attempting to rape. Pro
posed mechanisms include men having: (1) a special psychological ad
aptation that enables them to evaluate females' vulnerability to rape
(p. 66); (2) a special psychological adaptation to prefer to rape women
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at peak fertility (p. 71); (3) a psychological adaptation to be sexually
aroused by gaining physical control over an unwilling sexual partner
(p. 75); (4) a psychological adaptation to rape wives and girlfriends if
they believe their women are cheating on them (pp. 77-78); and fi
nally, (5) a psychological adaptation for male paranoia about women's
claims of being raped (p. 158).
But under either evolutionary scenario women are also hypothe
sized to have evolved rape-related adaptations - specifically, an ad
aptation for psychological anguish upon being raped. The supposition
is that rape victims suffer an overall loss in reproductive success. Psy
chological anguish is thus hypothesized to have been an adaptation to
help women guard against such reproductive loss. The psychological
adaptation focuses the victim's attention on the causes of the loss and
helps her avoid repetition of those causes (p. 85). The basic evolution
ary assumptions here are that rape reduces a woman's reproductive
success by circumventing her mate choice, that it reduces her mate's
reproductive success by lowering his certainty of paternity, and that it
reduces the fitness of the relatives of the victim and her mate (p. 85).
In addition, reproductive losses could be expected from getting raped,
insofar as the act causes physical injury, the loss of a victim's ability to
use copulation as a means of obtaining material benefits from men,
the interference with a victim's mate's protection of her, or a reduc
tion in the quality or quantity of parental care given by her mate (p.
86).
According to Thornhill and Palmer, the adaptation of psychologi
cal anguish manifests itself differently in different circumstances of
rape. Women of peak reproductive age are hypothesized to experi
ence more psychological pain than females of either pre- or post
reproductive age (pp. 89-90). This is because the reproductive costs to
these young women from getting raped are higher.
In addition, Thornhill and Palmer predict that reproductive-age
victims will experience more violent attacks than the pre- or post
reproductive-age rape victims (pp. 91-92). The basis of this prediction
lies in the hypothesis that reproductive-age women are more likely to
fight back "because of the greater evolutionary historical cost to their
reproductive success of being raped" (pp. 91-92), and that rapists
would be more highly sexually motivated to complete the rape in re
productive-age victims because of these victims' greater sexual attrac
tiveness relative to victims in the other two categories (p. 92).
Other hypothesized adaptations among females include: (1) the
tendency to experience decreased psychological pain as the violence of
the attack increases - this is because physical injury helps to prove to
her mate that the sex really was forced and not consensual (p. 92); (2)
"the absence of orgasm during rape" (p. 99); and (3) the tendency to
avoid risky situations, especially during the fertile phase of her cycle
(p. 100).
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Thornhill and Palmer then use the supposed existence of female
psychological rape adaptations to bolster their claims for specific male
psychological rape-adaptations and to counter two alternatives to their
theory. One would expect to find rape behavior to be ubiquitous in
human societies, if it is genuinely adaptive for men; "women's appar
ent adaptation to deal with rape . . . implies that rape has been com
mon enough in human evolutionary history to select for counter
adaptations in women" (p. 57). This, they claim, refutes the alternative
explanation that rape results from a low-frequency mutation, where a
rape mutation would occur in the population, but would not be se
lected either for or against. Such an explanation would imply that rape
is not an evolutionary adaptation (p. 57). They also use the hypothe
sized female adaptations against rape to argue that rape is not a re
cently derived cultural anomaly generated by new circumstances in the
human environment (p. 58). In other words, they use the supposed
female adaptations against rape to rule out two possible alternatives to
their two favored hypotheses.
In sum, the authors focus their attention on what they present as
the only two plausible candidates for the evolutionary explanation of
rape: either it is an adaptation itself, or it is a byproduct of other as
pects of evolved male sexuality. There is much more to be said re
garding the evidence that they offer for this panoply of psychological
adaptations to rape, both male and female, some of which I cover in
Part III below. But first we must investigate the soundness of the en
tire evolutionary framework within which the authors work.
II. THE THEORY
This Part examines Thornhill and Palmer's use of evolutionary bi
ology. They begin by claiming that "selection is the most important
cause of evolution," a contested, empirical claim (p. 8). What is evi
dent from this bit of theoretical positioning is that Thornhill and
Palmer are in the business of looking for explanations of traits in rela
tion to the selective causes that produced them, thus ignoring the
other four accepted forces of evolution - drift, mutation, recombina
tion, and gene flow among groups in subdivided populations.7 Evolu
tionary biologists standardly refer to strategies like Thornhill and
Palmer's as "adaptationism," since such approaches seek to explain all
interesting traits in terms of selective forces alone. In fact, Thornhill
and Palmer equate an "ultimate or evolutionary analysis" with adapta
tionism explicitly. They claim that the challenge for such an analysis is
"to determine the nature of the selective pressure that is responsible
for the trait. That selective pressure will be apparent in the functional
7. See ELIZABETH A. LLOYD, THE
EVOLUTIONARY THEORY (2d ed. 1994).

STRUCTURE

AND

CONFIRMATION

OF
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design of the adaptation" (p. 9). In other words, they want to infer in
formation about the selection pressure from the "design" of a trait,
and to assume that the only relevant evolutionary force shaping the
trait was natural selection.
.
This is not the way evolutionary analysis is typically done. First,
Thornhill and Palmer simply assume that rape behavior constitutes a
single, genuine trait. In fact, the standards of evolutionary biology re
quire that they independently establish this assumption. To establish
evolutionary traithood independently, the scientist must show that the
trait has some distribution in the population and that is inherited. But
establishing that rape is a single trait could perhaps be a problem be
cause of its wide variety of types of occurrences - because, in other
words, the majority of rape victims are babies, men, animals, post
menopausal women, etc.8 In addition, Thornhill and Palmer offer no
studies of the inheritance of raping behavior.
One also needs to show that the trait is an adaptation. There are a
number of ways to do this. One is to look at existing genotypic and
phenotypic9 variations in the current population of the trait: given that
few men rape, there would seem to be ample evidence of variation
from which to work. From this variation, the scientist can then com
pare the differences in reproductive success between those exhibiting
the trait and those not. If a positive reproductive advantage for those
exhibiting the trait is found, then the evolutionist starts to look for the
possible adaptive scenarios under which the trait could have evolved.
Another important research avenue exists for establishing that a
trait is an adaptation. Evolutionary biologists often compare the spe
cies in question (in this case, human beings) with their closest relatives
to see if the trait is manifested elsewhere in the lineage. This approach
is not foolproof, but it does provide important information regarding
when the trait might have evolved, and under what circumstances. If
the trait is found to be an adaptation in closely related species, then it
can be viewed with more confidence as an adaptation in human be
ings.
Finally, especially if the trait is not exhibited with any frequency in
the closely related species, the scientist must examine the past evolu
tionary circumstances of human beings very carefully for evidence that
there was, indeed, a plausible set of circumstances under which the
trait could have evolved. This would involve examination of past social
structures, population sizes, migration rates, and material culture.
These are the customary standards in evolutionary theory neces
sary to demonstrate that a trait is an adaptation. Not all of these re.

8. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.

9. The phenotype of an organism is the particular collection and arrangement of all its
manifest physical traits.
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search questions may be answerable, in which case the conclusion that
a trait is an adaptation is correspondingly weakened.
The fact that Thornhill and Palmer do not adhere to any of these
standards of evidence was pointed out by Frans B.M. de Waal, a dis
tinguished primatologist who works on evolutionary adaptations him
self, in a review in The New York Times. As de Waal puts it: "for natu
ral selection to favor rape, rapists would have to differ genetically
from nonrapists and need to sow their seed more successfully . . .
causing more pregnancies than nonrapists, or at least more than they
would without raping. Not a shred of data for these two requirements
is presented."10
One of the ways that Thornhill and Palmer attempt to get around
some of these evidentiary requirements is to claim that selection in the
past has fixed the trait in the population, i.e., ·that all men (and
women) now carry the genetic underpinnings that could lead to raping
behavior (pp. 57, 80, 142, 194). This move - undefended as it is allows them to skip the potential evidentiary requirement of showing
reproductive correlations between carrying the genetic underpinning
and not carrying the genetic underpinning in the present population.
But it does not relieve them of the other burdens of evidence listed
above. In fact, nowhere in the book do the authors present evidence
regarding either relevant details of the past evolutionary environment
or comparisons with our closest relatives. Nor do they discuss seriously
the possibility that rape itself is not a single trait.
Moreover, despite their own warning that the trait of rape behav
ior is not necessarily adaptive to current conditions, nearly all of the
evidence they offer concerns precisely contemporary circumstances of
rape (pp. 71-73, 88-89). This could be relevant evidence if they showed
the relative reproductive success of rapists and nonrapists, but they do
not. Thus, according to the usual evolutionary standards of evidence
regarding demonstration that a trait is an adaptation, Thornhill and
Palmer fail rather spectacularly. They begin by assuming that rape is a
single trait, and that this trait is an adaptation, and they reason back
wards from there. Needless to say, this undermines their repeated
claims that they are doing good science.
Thornhill and Palmer cite G.C. Williams's famous admonition that
not all aspects of an organism are adaptations produced by natural
selection, and that "adaptation is a special and onerous concept that
should be used only where it is really necessary."11 And, in fact, even if
one can show that a trait increases reproductive success, one cannot
10. Frans B.M. de Waal, Survival ofthe Rapist, N.Y.TIMES, April 2, 2000, § 7, at 24. Pre
sumably, de Waal intends for these requirements to be met at some point in evolutionary
time.
11. P. 9 (quoting GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, ADAPTATION AND NATURAL SELECTION 4
(1966)).
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conclude that it is an adaptation, according to Williams. Williams re
quires that, in order to show that a trait was designed by natural selec
tion, one must show at least that a trait accomplishes its alleged func
tion with "sufficient precision, economy,.and efficiency, etc."12 This is
a challenging requirement to meet in the case of human rape, consid
ering that 29% of rape victims are ten years of age or under,13 that
much rape involves oral or anal intercourse, that only 50% of males
achieve ejaculation during vaginal rape,1 4 and that male-male rape
makes up approximately 23% of rapes.15
In order to avoid this difficult standard, Thornhill and Palmer ap
peal to one of their most-cited authors, Donald Symons, who wrote
The Evolution of Human Sexuality,16 and who, by the way, introduced
a new low in "scientific" evidence by using Playboy magazine mail-in
survey results to support some of his conclusions.17 Symons's own in
terpretation of Williams's strict requirement significantly softens the
demand for evidence needed to show an adaptation. He says that
Williams only requires that one "rule out chance as an adequate ex
planation of [a trait's] existence."18 Very few evolutionists would ac
cept this as an adequate reading of Williams's book.
Thornhill and Palmer demonstrate that they are not engaged in
careful scientific analysis when they ignore all of this, instead claiming
that one can rule out drift and mutation as forces in explanations of
evolutionary history when a trait "shows evidence of functional de
sign" (p. 10). But they make no mention of Sewall Wright's results to
the contrary in population genetics,1 9 which clearly demonstrate the
possibility of mutation and drift playing a major role in producing ad
aptations, in his Shifting Balance theory.
Thornhill and Palmer even misunderstand the role of mutation per
se in evolution by claiming that "mutation, as an evolutionary cause
for traits, may apply only to those traits that are only slightly above
zero frequency in the population" (p. 10). In fact, this is true only for
strongly deleterious traits; modem population genetics, in the so12. P. 10 (quoting WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 10).
13. P. 72; DEAN G. KILPATRICK ET AL. FOR NAT'L VICTIM CENTER, RAPE IN
AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION§ 1 (1992).
14. P. 121; see Jerry A. Coyne, Of Vice and Men, NEW REPUBLIC, April 3, 2000 (re
viewing RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE:
BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL COERCION (2000) ).
15. A 1998 U.S. study showed that about 302,100 women and 92,700 men are raped each
year nationwide. See Michael Ellison, The Men Can't Help It, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON),
January 25, 2000, at 4.
16. DONALD SYMONS, THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SEXUALITY (1979).
17. Id. at ch. 7.
18. P. 10 (quoting SYMONS, supra note 16, at 11).
19. Sewall Wright, Evolution in Mendelian Populations, 16 GENETICS 97 (1931).
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called "neutral theory,"20 allows for much higher rates of mutation re
tention in the absence of selection.21.
One especially startling aspect of in Thornhill and Palmer's version
of evolutionary theory is their claim that "the study of the profound
implications of evolutionary theory - particularly the ability of selec
tion to form adaptations - has, until recently, been relatively unex
plored" (p. 106). Now, anyone who knows the history of evolutionary
biology knows this is an incorrect statement. 22 This isjust part of the
so-called evolutionary psychologists' valorization of themselves as
starting a "new" movement in evolutionary biology. Thornhill and
Palmer exhibit their identification of evolution with adaptation by
evolution yet again by claiming that "the diversity of life has two ma
jor components: adaptations and the effects of adaptations" (p. 11).
This claim demonstrates their ignorance of the population genetics
models showing the power of mutation and drift to shape life-forms
and species. These oversights are not trivial. The authors' ignorance of
the actual theory of evolution damages their credibility - especially in
light of their repeated claims that they are experts in evolutionary the
ory.
Is it possible, though, that their ignorance of the actual workings of
evolutionary theory has no real consequences for their overall line of
reasoning? No, for they rely on these misunderstandings to eliminate
alternative hypotheses regarding the evolution of rape. For example,
they list four evolutionary causes of trait change or trait maintenance
in evolutionary lines - selection, drift, gene flow, and mutation and end up discarding all but selection as a possible evolutionary cause
of rape behavior (pp. 56-59). Th� most bizarre aspect of the little set of
arguments that they use is that, despite their later acknowledgment
that population geneticists are the experts in determining the balances
and possibilities of those four causes (p. 106), they cite no population
geneticists in their arguments that selection alone explains the exis
tence of rape. Instead, they fabricate their own conclusions about the
20. See MOTOO KIMURA, THE NEUTRAL THEORY OF MOLECULAR EVOLUTION
(1983).
21. Thornhill and Palmer make use of their mistaken view about mutation on p. 57, in
the context of dismissing the hypothesis that rape could have arisen as a mutation balanced
by selection.
22. See, e.g., JENS CLAUSEN, STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF PLANT SPECIES (1951);
CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (Harvard Univ. Press 1964) (1859);
THEODOSIUS DOBZHANSKY, GENETICS AND THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES (1937); VERNE
GRANT, THE ORIGIN OF ADAPTATIONS (1963); DAVID LACK, THE NATURAL
REGULATION OF ANIMAL NUMBERS (1954); ERNST MAYR, SYSTEMATICS AND THE ORIGIN
OF SPECIES (1942); PHILLIP M. SHEPPARD, NATURAL SELECTION AND HEREDITY (1958);
GEORGE G. SIMPSON, THE MAJOR FEATURES .OF EVOLUTION (1953); GEORGE L.
STEBBINS, VARIATION AND EVOLUTION IN PLANTS (1950); Richard c. Lewontin,
Dobzhansky's Genetics and the Origin of Species; ls it Still Rele vant?, 147 GENETICS 351
(1997); Wright, supra note 19.
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likelihood of each cause, and then present their foregone conclusion:
that only selection could have caused the propensity to rape.
Return to Thornhill and Palmer's main fallacious conclusion: that
"the diversity of life has two major components: adaptations and the
effects of adaptations" (p. 11). Regarding "effects of adaptations,"
they give the useful example of the trait of the red color of human
blood. This trait is a byproduct or epiphenomenon of the chemistry of
oxygen and hemoglobin in the blood, plus the existence of human
color vision. Byproducts or epiphenomena are not directly selected for
their advantages to reproductive success, unlike real adaptations.
Thornhill and Palmer make a contentious claim about these epi
phenomena, namely, that they are always byproducts of adaptations
for other things. This does not follow, and it is not the mainstream
evolutionary view. For example, many traits categorized as evolution
ary byproducts are understood as phylogenetic remnants, leftovers
from the evolutionary ancestors of the species in question. But this
does not mean that they ever were or were not under selection pres
sure. Take the human trait of having five fingers on each hand. This
trait traces to the beginnings of the vertebrate lineage. Some verte
brates - horses, for example - endured selection pressure to change
the number of phalanges, from five down to one for each limb. Other
vertebrates underwent selection for grasping branches, reducing the
number to four, and yet most vertebrates retain the five-digit limb.
Now, does the fact that human beings customarily have five digits sig
nify that there was selection for five and only five digits in human an
cestry? The generally accepted evolutionary answer is "no." 23 Devia
tions from the basic vertebrate body-plan of five digits are understood
as having undergone mutation and selection for those mutations, while
the default property of having five digits is not seen as having been di
rectly selected in this case. This phenomenon is called "phylogenetic
inertia,'' wherein a trait remains the same unless it is actively selected
to change. This is true even in the deep evolutionary past, at the be
ginnings of the vertebrate line, where having five rather than four dig
its was perhaps an incidental side-effect of selection on other aspects
of the vertebrate skeleton, or may well have been the only variant
that, for other reasons, survived to found the lineage of vertebrates.
Thornhill and Palmer hold a deviant' evolutionary view of the role
of phylogenetic inertia in evolutionary explanations. They claim that
phylogenetic inertia - or the difficulty of changing body plans and the
resultant continuation of a trait in a lineage - is not an evolutionary
explanation of anything, because it does not involve an evolutionary
"cause" of the maintenance of a trait in a lineage of species. This is be
cause the phylogenetic cause of a trait in a given species does not iden-

23. See STEPHEN J. GOULD, ONTOGENY AND PHYLOGENY (1977).
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tify the "ultimate cause of the continuance" (p. 55). They use a clever
example to bolster this view: the trait of the crossing over of the diges
tive and respiratory tracts in (land) vertebrates. Here, they claim, the
trait is maintained in all. relevant species through constant selection.
Such a set-up, awkward and dangerous though it is, was necessary to
maintain the digestive and respiratory functions through the history of
vertebrates. And (land) vertebrates not conforming to the basic body
plan would be nonviable, and would be selected against. Therefore,
they conclude, "all evolutionary constraints and phylogenetic legacies
ultimately involve selection in some way" (p. 56). But think: does this
argument apply equally well to having five digits, a trait that just as
likely was fixed in the phylogenetic past as an incidental correlate to a
basically successful body plan? Of course not.
Thus it is incorrect, according to modern evolutionary theory, to
say that every trait is either an adaptation or an effect of an adaptation
in the sense that Thornhill and Palmer use this dichotomy. And this
mistake profoundly weakens Thornhill and Palmer's basic position, for
they use this false dichotomy to set up a false choice: either rape is a
specific adaptation, directly selected for in virtue of its superior repro
ductive success, or it is a byproduct of other adaptations, an incidental
side effect of special-purpose adaptations to circumstances other than
rape. These two options are not, in fact, exhaustive.
Having set up their supposedly exhaustive choice between a direct
adaptation and a byproduct, they proceed to argue that very specific
psychological adaptations should· be selected for in evolution. This dis
cussion reveals their adherence to the scientifically undefended thesis
- in fact, one contradicted by neurophysiological evidence24 - that
the brain is constructed of a high number of very special-purpose
physiological mechanisms. This view is a familiar hobby-horse of a
group of authors calling themselves "evolutionary psychologists."25
While on the topic, I should point out the exceedingly high density
of references to this small group of authors in this book, who them
selves engage in heavy cross-citation, and the fact that these authors
are considered a fringe group by most evolutionary theorists. This
·
group repeatedly demonstrates its narrow understanding of evolution
ary theory itself, and its misinterpretations of some elements of mod
ern evolutionary biology; and they rarely cite more mainstream evolu
tionary theory or genetics, either contemporary or historical.26

24. See D. Buller & F.G. Hardcastle, Evolutionary Psychology, Meet the Developing
Brain: Combating Promiscuous Modularity, BRAIN AND MIND (forthcoming 2001).
25. Pp. 15-20; see Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Evolutionary Psychology: The Burdens of Proof,
14 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 211 (1999).
26. E.A. Lloyd & M.W. Feldman, Evolutionary Psychology: A View from Evolutionary
Biology, PSYCHOL. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2001).
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At any rate, Thornhill and Palmer claim that we should expect
human psychological adaptations to be special-purpose rather than
general-purpose. This supposedly buttresses the rape-specific adapta
tion hypothesis in the following way: the reproductive problems facing
our human ancestors were very specific, therefore the mechanism, i.e.,
the tendency to rape itself, that "solved" these problems is also likely
to be specific and not a byproduct of a more general adaptation, and
thus favored by evolution.
Other literature on the relations between human culture and psy
chology and genetics in evolutionary biology is oddly missing from
Thornhill and Palmer's book. Thornhill and Palmer ignore the careful,
quantitative and theoretical work that has been done on the coevolu
tion of genes and culture. 27 These authors concentrate on the mutual
effects that genes and culture have had and can have on human evolu
tion. Unlike Thornhill and Palmer, they do not see cultural and bio
logical explanations as on the same level of explanation, nor do they
attempt to reduce one to the other.28 While Thornhill and Palmer do
appeal to one of these authors' works (once) (p. 27), conclusions in
this section of their book aim toward showing that cultural research
has no legitimate explanatory role outside of direct evolutionary con
siderations. They approvingly quote Margo Wilson when she writes:
"Darwinian selection is the only known source of the functional com
plexity of living things, and biologists have no reason to suspect that
there are any others."29 Contrary to this claim, the biologists working
on gene-culture coevolution see culture as an important contributor to
the evolved complexity of human beings. Nevertheless, Thornhill and
Palmer maintain, "[t]he realization that culture is behavior places it
clearly within the realm of biology, and hence within the explanatory
realm of natural selection" (p. 25). But in contrast to Thornhill and
Palmer, the above authors30 have shown that different explanatory
levels are legitimate in evolutionary theory.
27. E.g., ROBERT BOYD & PETER J. RICHERSON, CULTURE AND TIIE EVOLUTIONARY
PROCESS (1985); L. L. CAVALLI-SFORZA & MARCUS W. FELDMAN, CULTURAL
TRANSMISSION AND EVOLUTION (1981); WILLIAM H. DURHAM, COEVOLUTION: GENES,
CULTURE AND HUMAN DIVERSITY (1991); L. L. Cavalli-Sforza & M.W. Feldman, Darwin
ian Selection and "Altruism'', 14 THEORETICAL POPULATION BIOLOGY 268 (1978); Kevin N.
Laland et al., Niche Construction, Biological Evolution, and Cultural Change, 23 BEHAV. &
BRAIN SCI. 131 (2000); Kevin N. Laland et al., The Evolutionary Consequences of Niche
Construction: A Theoretical Investigation Using Two-Locus Theory, 9 J. EVOLUTIONARY
BIOLOGY 293 (1996); Richard C. Lewontin, Gene, Organism, and Environment, in
EVOLUTION FROM MOLECULES TO MEN 273 (D.S. Bendall for Darwin College ed., 1983).
28. Different "levels of explanation" appeal to different entities and laws, at distinct
levels of the organization of life. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
29. P. 122 (quoting Margo Wilson et al., Femicide: An Evolutionary Psychological Per
spective, in FEMINISM AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 431, 433 (Patricia A. Gowaty ed.,
1997)).
30. See supra note 27.
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Ill. THE EVIDENCE
This Part considers some of the specific evidence and arguments
Thornhill and Palmer offer to support their various claims about evo
lutionary adaptations, bearing in mind the usual evolutionary stan
dards of evidence discussed previously. Overall, as Jerry Coyne and
Andrew Berry pointed out in their review in Nature, at least three
types of problems inhere in the evidence presented by Thornhill and
Palmer: it "either fails to support their case, is presented in a mislead
ing and/or biased way, or equally supports alternative explanations."31
This Part reviews their samples of each problem and then moves on to
other flaws.
Coyne and Berry note that Thornhill and Palmer rely heavily on
the claim that rape victims of reproductive age are strongly overrepre
sented among rape victims to support their view that the rapists' evo
lutionary agenda is reproductive in nature. But, Coyne and Berry
point out, some data Thornhill and Palmer present actually contradict
this claim. In a 1992 survey attempting to overcome the serious statis
tical problem of unreported rapes, 29% of female U.S. rape victims
were ten years of age and under (p. 72). Given that this age group
comprises about 15% of the female population, nonreproductive age
females were overrepresented by a factor of two in the set of rape vic
tims.32 Clearly, the trait of raping under-age girls would not be adap
tive, yet Thornhill and Palmer try to explain the statistics away by em
phasizing that the data did not contain information regarding how
many of these ten-and-under girls were exhibiting secondary sexual
characteristics (p. 72). As Coyne and Berry note, this is a rather glar
ing case of special pleading, which effectively undermines Thornhill

31. Jerry A. Coyne & Andrew Berry, Rape as an Adaptation: Is this Contentious Hy
pothesis Advocacy, Not Science ? 404 NATURE· 121, 121 (2000) (reviewing RANDY
THORNHILL & CRAIG T. PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASES OF
SEXUAL COERCION (2000)). Coyne is an evolutionary population geneticist in the Depart
ment of Ecology and Evolution at the University of Chicago, one of the strongest evolution
ary biology departments in the world. Andrew Berry is an evolutionary geneticist and a Re
search Associate at the Museum of Comparative Zoology at Harvard University, part of
perhaps the most prestigious set of biological departments in the world. Nevertheless, in an
astonishing reply, Thornhill reacted to the Coyne and Berry review saying, "[t]hese a'nti
evolution critics don't like evolution applied to any feature of life, but especially not to hu
man traits." Rape Theory Attacked; Evolutionary Basis Disputed, CINCINNATI POST, March
9, 2000, at 3A (emphasis added). Generally, Thornhill believes that Coyne and Berry's op
position to the book "is a scientifically invalid view. Therefore, it must be inspired by some
ideology. We might as well have gotten our book reviewed by the pope." Richard
Monastersky, Scientists Debunk the Idea that Evolution Makes Rapists, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Mar. 17, 2000, at A24 (reviewing RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG T. PALMER, A
NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL COERCION (2000) ).
32. Coyne & Berry, supra note 31, at 121. A 1998 U.S. study puts the rate of rape of girls
twelve and under at 22%. Ellison, supra note 15. This is still approximately 150% of their
representation in the population.
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and Palmer's claim that they are actually trying to test their hypothe
sis.
Coyne and Berry also draw attention to a far more dramatic and
deceptive use of evidence.33 Remember, Thornhill and Palmer claim
that rape victims of reproductive age (age twelve to forty-four) are
more traumatized by rape than females who are either too young (un
der twelve) or too old (over forty-four) to reproduce (pp. 89-90). This
apparent difference in the age classes supposedly supports their con
tention that rape is essentially a reproductive act. But when Coyne
and Berry checked the cited reference for this claim, they found a
problem: the original work's conclusions differ crucially from those
claimed by Thornhill and Palmer, despite the fact that Thornhill was
one of the coauthors of the cited paper. The only real difference in
rape victims' anguish is in the under-twelve class, who were recorded
as experiencing much less trauma. The reproductive-age group and
the over-forty-four group experienced equal amounts of trauma. Ap
parently, in order to avoid a contradiction with their prediction,
Thornhill and Palmer used a statistical sleight of hand. They pooled
the statistic from the under-twelve and the .over-forty-four groups in
order to have the reduced-trauma under-twelve group overwhelm the
statistic from the forty-four-plus group. There are, indeed, lies,
damned lies, and statistics.
Coyne and Berry also criticized Thornhill and Palmer for ignoring
the fact that some of their evidence equally supports alternative hy
potheses. This actually occurs repeatedly, but the case picked out by
Coyne and Berry is the claim that women of reproductive age experi
ence more violence during rape than do older women and children,
which is used by Thornhill and Palmer to suggest that they fight back
harder because they have more reproductive fitness to defend. But, as
Coyne and Berry point out, a parsimonious explanation of this fact is
that women of reproductive age are physically stronger, and thus most
capable of fighting back compared to girls or older women. Coyne and
Berry remark, "[i]n exclusively championing their preferred explana
tion of a phenomenon, even when it is less plausible than alternatives,
the authors reveal their true colours. A Natural History of Rape is ad
vocacy, not science."34
Consider a few more examples of Thornhill and Palmer's handling
of evidence and reasoning. Take their claim that rape is all and only
about sexual reproduction - the club they use to batter the view of
feminists who hold that rape is about both sex and domination or con
trol of women. Thornhill and Palmer admit in passing that some hold
ers of the byproduct view see rape as resulting fro� a combination of
33. Coyne & Berry, supra note 31, at 122.
34. Coyne & Berry, supra note 31, at 122.
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male sexual desire and the "drive to possess and control."35· But they
dismiss this very plausible evolutionary view by claiming that ordinar
ily there is no drive to possess and control victims "for prolonged pe
riods of time" (p. 62). But, of col,lrse, the period of time is irrelevant to
whether that desire is a contributing proximate cause to rape.
And what happened to the patently obvious hypothesis that raping
behavior is due to psychopathology? In one of the two studies of de
velopmental factors affecting rape that Thornhill and Palmer do dis
cuss in the book, psychopathology played a leading explanatory role.
This study of adolescent male sexual criminals36 found that rapists
were characterized by backgrounds of repeated frustration, failed ro
mantic and sexual relationships, as well as lower psychosocial func
tioning, learning disabilities, and psychological disorders (p. 67). But
Thornhill and Palmer want to treat psychopathic men as a group dis
tinct from rapists, claiming (with no evidence) that psychopaths make
up a distinct genetic form, and that normal men do not have the same
adaptations.37 In fact, they suggest that "psychopathic and normal men
possess two distinct psychological adaptations with regard to rape both of which could be condition dependent" (p. 82; emphasis added).
Here is yet another candidate for special pleading. Interestingly, this
resembles a similar problem that Thornhill and Palmer have with the
fact that high-status men, who are otherwise able to secure sexual
partners, rape, thus challenging their theory that only losers rape. In
that case, they propose that "their raping must result from adaptations
other than that suggested by the [low-status) hypothesis" (p. 68). Thus,
we have two more specific psychological adaptations proposed in or
der to deal with anomalies from the main rape adaptation theory, un
der which the genetic underpinnings of rape were supposedly fixed
among human beings. We can see an evasive tactic emerging: if ever
an anomaly threatens Thornhill and Palmer's project, they simply
propose more psychological adaptations.
35. P. 61. The authors cite LEE ELLIS, THEORIES OF RAPE: INQUIRIES INTO THE
CAUSES OF SEXUAL AGGRESSION (1989); Lee Ellis, The Drive to Possess and Control as a
Motivation for Sexual Behavior: Applications to the Study of Rape, 30 Soc. SCI. INFO. 633
(1991); and Neil M. Malamuth, The Confl.ue.nce Model of Sexual Aggression: Feminist and
Evolutionary Perspectives, in SEX, POWER, CONFLICT 269 (David M. Buss & Neil M.
Malamuth eds., 1996).
36. Aurelio J. Figueredo et al., A Brunswikian Evolutionary-Developmental Model of
Adolescent Sex Offending, BEHAV. SCI. & L. 309 (2000).
37. Geoffrey Miller, evolutionary psychologist at University College, London, also
challenges Thornhill and Palmer's neglect of the psychopathology explanation: "psychopaths
are discussed on only one page, though they account for a substantial proportion of all rap
ists, and the majority of multiple rapists. . . research shows there are heritable genetic differ
ences in many traits that may predict the tendency to use sexual coercion, such as disagree
ableness, psychoticism, low intelligence and a!Coholism." Geoffrey Miller, Why Men Rape,
EVENING STANDARD, Mar. 6, 2000, at 53 (reviewing RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG T.
PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL COERCION
(2000)).
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Yet another type of data is patently relevant to Thornhill and
Palmer's hypotheses but is not considered: comparisons between hu
man beings and our closest relatives, the chimpanzee and the bonobo.
Thornhill and Palmer seem to have an internal conflict about whether
to use comparative evidence, even though it is standard in contempo
rary evolutionary analyses. In one place, they argue for the impor
tance of comparative analysis, "which is a fundamental tool in biology
for understanding causation" (p. 120). They follow this approach when
they appeal to the claim that rape occurs in many nonhuman species,
such as orangutans. But when it comes to our closest relatives, the
standards change: they claim that it is erroneous to think that the be
havior of nonhuman primates is necessarily salient to human adapta
tions (p. 56). What motivates this sudden switch? Perhaps this: the rate
of rape among chimpanzees is very low, and the majority of these are
brother-sister rapes; moreover, rape has never been observed at all in
bonobos.38 These are our two closest living relatives. This information
clearly damages their case. It places extra burdens on them to produce
a uniquely human account of the evolution of rape, one that does not
rely on common traits about sex differences in sexuality that we share
with our nearest relatives. Instead, Thornhill and Palmer rely heavily
on comparative evidence from scorpionflies (pp. 63-64).
Finally, perhaps the crucial assumption of their entire book is that
rape is, indeed, a reproductively successful strategy - but they leave
this assumption almost completely unsupported.· In fact, the current
rape statistics seemingly undermine their conclusions. According to a
study they cite themselves, the success rate that reported rapists cur
rently have at inseminating their victims is only about 2%.39 Worse for
Thornhill and Palmer, 50% of pregnant rape victims in a U.S. study
terminated their pregnancy through therapeutic abortions, and an
other 12% resulted in spontaneous abortion (p. 100). But Thornhill
and Palmer are not deterred by these results. They dismiss objections
to their views by stating that such contemporary evidence is not rele
vant to whether rape was an adaptation in our ev9lutionary past.40

38. Personal communication with Richard Wrangham, Harvard anthropologist. See
JANE GOODALL, THE CHIMPANZEES OF GOMBE (1986). Despite Thornhill and Palmer's
approving citations of Wrangham and Dale Peterson's Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins
of Human Violence, Wrangham notes there that feminists are. right in seeing rape as in
volved with power relations, not just as a conceptive strategy.
.

.

39. This 2% must be compared within the context of the overall lifetime reproductive
success of those using the rape strategy, those not, and mixed cases. Even though Thornhill
and Palmer do not compare these various strategies, it is still possible that a 2% rate of in
semination is strong enough to provide a selective pressure, even with high abortion rates.
They need to show that raping provided, at some time in history, a higher frequency of fer
tilization than non-raping for these individuals .. But they have not shown this.
40. This, in spite of their heavy use of such contemporary evidence in other contexts.
Nonetheless, the authors are certainly correct about this.
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The problem is that Thornhill and Palmer make no effort to de
scribe the relevant environmental (including cultural) circumstances in
our evolutionary past in any detail, either in support of or against the
rape hypotheses they consider. We would normally demand some evi
dence regarding, for example: the percentage of women who either
abort or kill their rape-begotten infants41; the likelihood that any given
woman of reproductive age either is nursing (with its concomitant re
duction in fertility) or is already pregnant at any given moment; or
what percentage of rapists were caught and punished, which could be
calibrated to the ancestral group size and the likelihood of being
caught. But Thornhill and Palmer make no effort to provide this cru
cial evidence, which is badly needed in order to evaluate their hy
potheses.
IV. THE ENEMY
Thornhill and Palmer begin their chapter on "Law and Punish
ment" with a caricature of social scientists, who supposedly believe in
"cultural determinism." They claim: "Cultural determinism is consis
tent with free will and with the ability of humans to change their be
havior easily by adopting new social constructs" (p. 153; emphasis
added). Needless to say, the "ease" of adopting new social constructs
is an imaginative piece of misinterpretation by Thornhill and Palmer.
Social scientists tend to view social and cultural forces as entrenched
and as acting over the lifetime of the individual's development, and
thus as very difficult to change. Hence, when Thornhill and Palmer
point out that the "ease" of change "is in conflict with everything that
is known about the interaction of genetic and environmental factors in
the development of all behavioral abilities"(p. 153), they are in
agreement, not opposition, with their supposed targets. They continue
by stating that our real need is to understand "how human-mediated
alterations in the developmental environment can produce desirable
behavioral changes" (p. 153), thus stating the obvious, and outlining
the standard goal of many sociological, criminal, and psychological
studies. Thornhill and Palmer see their stated goals as conflicting with
the social sciences only because they see evolutionary theory as "cru
cial, since it predicts that the developmental events of interest will oc
cur in response to specific cues that, in our history as a species, were
most reliably correlated with reduced consensual sex with females" (p.
154). But these specific cues are part of what the social scientists in
question study.

41. See SARAH BLAFFER HRDY, MOTHER NATURE: MATERNAL INSTINCTS AND How
THEY SHAPE THE HUMAN SPECIES (1999), in which she argues for the prevalence of abor
tion and infanticide in human evolutionary history.
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Moreover, instead of including fair critical examination of various
alternative hypotheses for the development of rape in men, Thornhill
and Palmer attack a caricature of what they call the "feminist psycho
social" position. They spend a full sixty pages of this slim 200-page
book attacking feminist views on rape, which they inexplicably equate
with "the social science theory." The feminist view supposedly says
that sex has absolutely nothing to do with rape (the "not sex" view),
and that rape is instead exclusively about the power and control over
women, about misogyny, and about the exercise of patriarchal values.
Their ultimate target for this view is Susan Brownmiller, who success
fully inspired changes in the political and legal atmosphere surround
ing treatment of rapists a1.1d victims with her 1975 book, Against Our
Will.42 In Thornhill and Palmer's precis of their book, published in The
Sciences, they wrote:
In 1975 the feminist writer Susan Brownmiller asserted that rape is moti
vated not by lust but by the urge to control and dominate. In the twenty
five years since, Brownmiller's view has become mainstream. All men
feel sexual desire, the theory goes, but not all men rape. Rape is viewed
as an unnatural behavior that has nothing to do with sex, and one that
has no corollary in the animal world.43
But Brownmiller never professed the primary mistake attributed
to her, namely, that rape does not involve sex. In fact, Brownmiller re
fers to rape as a sexual act throughout the whole 1975 book. For ex
ample, she calls rape "a 'taking' of sex through the use or threat of
force."44 Elsewhere she recounts instances in which rape is a sexual
reward for the male slave, and a sexual privilege for the masters.45 In
other words, she clearly and repeatedly categorizes rape as sex.
More recently, in an appearance on the National Public Radio
show "Talk of the Nation" with Thornhill, Brownmiller insisted:
I never said that rape was not involved with sex. Obviously, it uses the
sex organs. What the women's movement did say, starting in the 1970s,
was that rape was not sexy, you see. The men, up to that point, had ro
manticized rape and always presented scenarios of · beautiful but just
slightly unwilling, but really teasing victims. And the act was construed as
sort of a Robin Hood act of machismo. When wo1,I1en started to speak up
about their own experiences of rape, the first thing they said was, "No,
there's nothing sexy about this. This was pure power humiliation, degra
dation." And that's where the feminist theory came from, out of listening
to the experiences of women.46
42. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975).
43. Randy Thornhill & Craig T. Palmer, Why Men Rape, SCIENCES, Jan.-Feb. 2000, at
30, 30.
44. BROWNMILLER, supra note 42, at 377.
45. Id. at 157-58.
46. Talk of the Nation (Nat'! Public Radio, Jan. 26, 2000) (emphasis added).
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Thornhill expressed surprise during this radio show at Brownmil
ler's statement that sex was involved in rape. 47 But this response was
disingenuous at best, because Brownmiller had previously attempted
to correct Thornhill's specific misrepresentation of the feminist view
as the "not sex" view of rape. · She and Barbara Mehrhof were com
mentators on a 1992 target article in Brain and Behavioral Sciences
written by Thornhill and his former wife, Nancy Thornhill.48 In the
commentary, Brownmiller and Mehrhof state, "[t]he central insight of
the feminist theory of rape identifies the act as a crime of violence . . . .
The sexual motivation, orgasmic release, is a secondary component. "49
Why, then, does Thornhill now publicly feign surprise at
Brownmiller's resistance to the former's characterization of her view
as the "not sex" view? Perhaps because in their book, Thornhill and
Palmer attribute to Brownmiller a series of straw person "arguments"
that depend on her maintaining the "not sex" view. They then attempt
to debunk these arguments. A closer look reveals that what they claim
Brownmiller says differs from what Brownmiller actually said.
Take Thornhill and Palmer's "Argument 9," supposedly put for
ward by Brownmiller: "It is not a crime of lust but of violence and
power . . . rape victims are not only the 'lovely young blondes' of
newspaper headlines - rapists strike children, the aged, the homely
- all women" (p. 138). In elaborating their rebuttal to this claim,
Thornhill and Palmer focus on the ages of rape victims and argue:
The statement that "any female may become a victim of rape"
(Brownmiller 1974, p. 348) does not imply that the "rapist chooses his
victim with a striking disregard for conventional 'sex appeal' " (ibid., p.
338). Contrary to Brownmiller, although any female might become a vic
tim of rape, some women are far more likely to become victims of rape
than others. Indeed, one of the most consistent finding [sic] of studies on
rape, and one not likely to be due entirely to reporting bias, is that
women in their teens and their early twenties are highly overrepresented
among rape victims around the world.50
Now consider what Brownmiller actually said on the pages quoted.
On the same page as the second sentence they quote, Brownmiller
writes:
Statistical probability does matter. Just as there is a calculable "typical"
rapist, there is also, to a lesser degree of certainty, a "typical" victim.
While any woman is a natural target for a would-be rapist, the chances
47. Id. (Thornhill to Brownmiller: "And that you're saying now that rape is sex and so
forth is kind of amazing").
·

48. Randy Thornhill & Nancy W. Thornhill, The Evolutionary Psychology of Men 's Co
ercive Sexuality, 15 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 363 (1992).
49. Susan Brownmiller & Barbara Mehrhof, A Feminist Response to Rape as an Adap
tation in Men, 15(2) BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 381, 382 (1992).
50. Pp. 138-39.
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are that a rape victim will be of the same class and race as her attacker, at
least between 70 and 90 percent of the time. More often than not, she
also will be approximately the same age as her attacker, or slightly
younger. Overall, the danger to women is greatest between the ages of 10
and 29. Teenage girls, simply by being teenage girls, run the greatest risk
of any ag� group.51
In other words, Brownmiller explicitly denies that all women are
equally likely to become rape victims, and in fact emphasizes the same
results as Thornhill and Palmer, in direct contradiction to their charge.

In all, four of the nine "feminist" arguments they attempt to debunk
are attributed to Brownmiller, so it is significant that the textual evi
dence and the verbal reports of that author deny the basic premise of
these arguments, namely, that sex is not involved in rape. Further dif
ficulties abound. Feminist "Argument 1" consists of a quote taken
from opponents to a feminist understanding of rape (p. 133). Ordinar
ily, honest scientists consider versions of arguments from their propo
nents and not their proponents' enemies. This is not the only time,
however, that Thornhill and Palmer use the tactic of representing their
�nemies' views unfairly. For example, they also use antifeminist
Dwight D. Murphey,52 who presents a popular press version of
Brownmiller's view of rape that misrepresents her position as a "not
sex" view (p. 125). In sum, Thornhill and Palmer must be considered
unreliable on the issue of what feminists have said, and how it relates
to their own views.
Now consider the following argument: all matter is subject to the
laws of quantum mechanics and relativity theory. Therefore, popula
tion geneticists cannot have a legitimate explanation of the behavior
of genes, because they fail to appeal to the fundamental causes of mat
ter's behavior.53 This amounts to a denial of the legitimacy of an inde
pendent level of explanation for a non-"fundamental" theory.
Implausibly, Thornhill and Palmer use the same form of argument
in this book, wherein they reject higher, independent levels of expla
nation above the ordinary biological level as not being fundamental
enough. This argument is unacceptable regarding population genetics,
and it is unacceptable concerning the social science levels of explana
tion that Thornhill and Palmer want to delegitimate.
One of the most confused and confusing aspects of Thornhill and
Palmer's arguments is the claim that "every aspect of every living
thing is, by definition, biological" (p. 20). Their argument runs as fol
lows. All behavior is biological because it evolved. Therefore all ex·

51. BROWNMILLER, supra note 42, at 348.
52. Dwight D. Murphey, Feminism and Rape, 17 J. SOC. POL. & ECON. STUD. 13 (1992).
53. This example is due to Michael Dickson, History and Philosophy of Science De
partment, Indiana University.
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planations of that behavior must · be biological, since there is no psy
chological, sociological, or cultural explanation that is not fundamen
tally biology. Therefore, all research into behavior must involve and
be guided by evolutionary biology. As they put it, culture is "still bio
logical and subject to the only general biological theory - evolution
by selection" (p. 24). (Never mind the false equation of evolutionary
theory itself with evolution by selection.)
Shockingly, this line of argument is supposed to show that social
scientists such as psychologists and sociologists cannot do their re
search - investigating and identifying the range of environmental fac
tors influencing behavior - without doing evolutionary biology simul
taneously.54 Of course, it implies nothing of the kind: the search for
environmental factors affecting phenotypes can proceed in the com
plete absence of a specific evolutionary hypothesis. Furthermore,
having an evolutionary hypothesis about a trait does not by any means
isolate the relevant learning factors that go into producing that trait.
Both of these points ate. denied vehemently by Thornhill and Palmer
(pp. 84, 153, 156).
Note how the apparently trivial claim that "everything is biologi
cal" is now doing real work here. They want to claim that someone not
using the evolutionary level of explanation for a human phenomenon
offers no explanation at all. But even according to their own view, re
search into the relevant causes of different developmental outcomes in
human beings is a necessary part of the explaining that they want to
do. If some of the relevant causes are cultural, then cultural research
into such causes is totally legitimate, and in fact necessary. Or do they
want to rule out cultural causes as possible influences on human de
velopment? Apparently not, for they say, "[y]es, some differences in
behavior between individuals could be due entirely to cultural influ
ences that have affected their behavior" (pp. 24-25). But this does not
mean, they say, that "an individual's culturally influenced behavior is
due entirely to environmental causes and hence is not biological" (p.
25). But they have just admitted that, in the case at hand, the differ
ences between one individual and another can be entirely cultural, and
not explicable at the level of biology.
And therein lies the rub. They want to deny that cultural explana
tions can really explain anything - that the cultural level of investiga
tion is a legitimately e xplanatory one. On what basis? On the basis
that "an individual's cultural behavior is still a product of gene
environment interactions. And the individual can learn nothing with54. In criticizing social scientists, Thornhill and Palmer actually claim that evolved cog
nition itself may interfere with evolutionary investigation into cultural phenomena:
"Evolved psychological intuitions about behavioral causation can mislead individuals into
believing that they know a� much as experts do about proximate human motivation." P. 114
(emphasis added) . The experts on social behavior here seem to be the evolutionists, rather
than the social scientists.
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out underlying adaptation for learning" (p. 25). We can agree to these
last statements and yet believe that a purely cultural investigation of
individual differences in development is both necessary and explana
tory. Nevertheless, Thornhill and Palmer insist that "[t]he cultural be
havior of individuals is never independent of the human evolutionary
history of selection for individual reproductive success" (p. 29). What
they mean by "independent" here is explanatory independence, as be
comes painfully obvious in their fierce attack on the possibility of the
social sciences telling us anything useful about human rape. But they
have not successfully argued for explanatory dependence of the social
on the biological. At best, they have argued the reverse, with their
own admission of the explanatory power of cultural explanation of dif
ference.
V.

LEGAL AND S OCIAL CONSEQUENCES

Thornhill and Palmer repeatedly promise that. moving to the evo
lutionary level of explanation will make everything better: therapeutic
treatment of rape victims; reduction in the incidence of rape; im
provements in how rape is treated in the courts; and understanding of
the developmental, social, and cultural "conditional" factors produc
ing rapists from male babies (pp. 82, 84, 97, 114, 153, 154, 156, 158,
187). Despite this repetition, they offer no evidence whatsoever for
any of these claims; all we get are promises. But they do offer a few
concrete remarks, well supported or not, concerning the legal treat
ment of rapists. They also suggest ways to improve rape prevention
training.
As Thornhill and Palmer acknowledge, people have a strong ten
dency to react to their theories by_ indulging in what is known as the
"naturalistic fallacy": equating claims of what is "n_atural" with claims
of what is "good" or morally defensible. Since the authors do not con
done rape, they attempt to deter this reaction repeatedly. But their
eagerness to publish a poorly supported and inflammatory theory one that predictably evokes the natu�alistic fallacy - seems irrespon
sible. Most published editorials and letters to the ed�tor invoking these
authors commit precisely this fallacy. Accusing people of a "lack of
scholarship" just is not good enough (p. 122).
They respond to the naturalist fallacy as follo ws: "Contrary to the
common view that an evolutionary explanation for human behavior
removes individuals' responsibility for their actions, individuals who
really understood the evolutionary bases of their actions might be bet
ter able to avoid behaving in an 'adaptive' fashion that is damaging to
others" (p. 154). Now specifically how is this knowledge supposed to
help change the rapist's behavior? Do they have evidence that such
knowledge would be connected with a lower incidence of rape? Is this
even plausible? They propose a rape-prevention education program
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for teenage boys - one that could perhaps be required before they
get their driver's licenses -'-- which involves explaining the evolution
ary basis of their sexual desires, and which encourages them to control
their sexual impulses (p. 179). (And these are the authors who criti
cized the sociologists for believing that behavior can easily be
changed!) After such an education, they suggest, "refusal to refrain
from damaging behavior in the face of scientific understanding could
be seen as a ground for holding irresponsible individuals more culpa
ble, not less so" (p. 154).
This suggestion raises a host of questions. For instance: since they
emphasize that evolutionary theory is very complicated and difficult,
how are they planning to teach it in this mini-course?55 Also, since they
know that most people's reaction to their view is to commit the natu
ralistic fallacy, why assume that the instructees (or their instructors)
would be any different, and would not also conclude that rape is natu
ral, and therefore inevitable or acceptable? They do emphasize that
teaching that the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy will be part of their
suggested course (pp. 179-180), but can we assume that it will be un
derstood?
One striking thing about Thornhill and Palmer's discussion of rape
prevention and punishment is how many of their ideas are borrowed
directly from the feminist accounts they deride. For instance, they note
that "rape has traditionally been defined and punished not from the
victim's perspective but from a male perspective, and particularly from
the perspective of the victim's mate."56 They also note that rules and
laws generally serve the interests of the powerful - for example, men
as opposed to women.57 Furthermore, statutory rape laws should be
understood in the context that, in most societies, "daughters have
been viewed as their father's property."'58 As far as rape prevention
goes, their suggestions are nearly- all features thathave been central to
the feminist revolution in rape counseling: advising caution about
having men and women alone in isolated places; advocating self
defense training; urging women to exert greater control over circum
stances "in which they consent to be alone with men" (p. 186). They
differ from feminist advice in their recommendation that women wear
more concealing clothing (even though they offer no evidence of a
correlation between the amount of skin shown and rape). But
Thornhill and Palmer claim that all this follows only from the evolu55. Thornhill himself argued in a radio appearance: "(Y]ou know, evolutionary biology
is complex. Science is complex. In fact, many have pointed out that the facts and theory of
evolution are the qiqst complex set of ideas we have out there . . " Talk of the Nation (Nat'!
Public Radio, Jai;i. 2�, 2000).
.

.

56. Pp. 154-55; cf. BROWNMILLER, supra note 42, at 14, 18-30, 376-77.
57. P. 162; cf. BROWNMILLER, supra note 42, at 17.
58. P. 162; cf. BROWNMILLER, supra note 42, at 17-18, 376.
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tionary perspective, and that only the evolutionary perspective can
help direct research towards treatment that will alleviate the pain and
suffering caused by rape (pp. 187-88).
As far as legal punishment goes, Thornhill and Palmer do not pro
pose a specific program; they simply claim that any such program of
punishment should be informed by what is known about evolution.
They do discuss one possible punishment in detail, though - chemical
castration. They defend chemical castration on the basis of evolution,
claiming that since rape is about reproductive sex, chemical castration
might be an effective preventative.59 They fail .to address the problem,
however, that such an approach has a good chance of reducing the
conviction rate of rapists, since juries may be more reluctant to inter
fere with the suspect's "manhood" than they are to sending him to
prison for a few years.
All told, this book contains little information of specific interest to
lawyers, beyond this discussion of chemical castration and the constant
preaching about how an evolutionary approach is necessary to under
standing rape. Thornhill and Palmer's recommendations for rape pre
vention - with the exception of the driver's ed class - are not new.
The only thing really new here is that they urge both lawyers and lay
people alike to see rape as purely a sexual act, proximally motivated
by an out-of-control male libido. Of course, that view is not really new
either; in fact, it is rather old-fashioned. The public and lawyers alike
must decide if this reduced view of rape as sex alone really represents
the truth about rape. Based on the weaknesses in their evolutionary
biology alone, I think the answer is clear. When the data-fudging and
gross misrepresentation of other explanatory approaches are added to
the mix, I take it to be the responsibility of educated people to resist
Thornhill and Palmer's conclusions about rape. In fact, the only cir
cumstance under which I think this book should be read is one in
which a prosecutor is faced with a defendant's lawyer who plans to call
one of these authors or their followers to the stand. In that case, the
attorney should read the book, then go out and hire a real evolution
ary biologist as an expert witness.

59. Pp. 165-66. According to Dani Robbins Zulich, director of the Women's Coalition at
Case Western Reserve University, experiments in treating rapists with surgical and chemical
castration have not proven effective. See Karen Sandstrom, Study of Rape Hits Ideological
Wall; Linking Cause to Evolution Ignites Backlash, In Review of Thornhill and Palmer,
PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 27, 2000, at 1 11.

